agencies. In the light of the past experiences, partiality on the part of the NGO's can not be ruled out.

The other problem which would affect the reconstruction process directly is the lack of confidence in U.N agencies and NGO's by the refugees as well as the resistance groups. According to some estimates by the Afghans, around forty percent assistance did not reach them and the humanitarian assistance they received was not equally distributed among them.

Afghan Mujahideen have also complained against one of the co-ordinator's mission named Salam 3. Salam 3 was a direct fact finding mission to assess the needs of the people in nine provinces from Badakhshan to Paktia. It was also accompanied by 6 member Afghan delegation from Jamiat, Itehad and Mahaz groups. Hikmatyar, Younis Khalis, Sabghatullah Mujadadi and Nabi Mohammadi did not agree with the survey programme and refused to send delegates. There were to be no private meetings but the U.N Co-ordinator's mission met many commanders without the presence of accompanying Afghan delegation. This conduct would discourage the cooperation of Mujahideen with future fact finding missions.

There is a serious need to develop understanding with all Afghans on equal basis for the successful implementation of relief and rehabilitation operations.

Co-relation of Requirements & Assistance

A greater precentage of pledges, donors have earmarked for specific UN agencies or NGOs. The aid in kind will not necessarily suit the on-ground requirements of the population. For example, in the previous years, sleeping bags and combat trousers, which were sent for the Mujahideen appeared in the Pakistani bazzars. Such actions will be a constraint on the flexibility for the allocation of funds and commodities depending on the changing needs of the relief and rehabilitation operations.

Ideally, reconstruction should precede repatriation of the displaced population in order to prepare the basic infrastructure required for ensuring an early settlement and self reliance in the home areas. But, as envisaged, the reconstruction and rehabilitation activities will go on side by side. It will be crucial to ensure that relief and rehabilitation assistance will be provided in a timely and co-cordinated way. The expectations of the recipients would be high. Therefore any delay in the activities of relief will cause dissatisfaction and frustration which might lead to many social and political problems.

CONCLUSION.

In view of the above mentioned problems and dynamic politico-military situation the prospects for the re-construction of Afghanistan in near future are very limited. However the recovery time and speed depends to a great extent on the rational, and integrated problem solving approach of the Afghan leadership in future.

REFERENCES

1. The Agricultural Survey of Afghanistan Swedish Committee for Afghanistan. First Draft May 1988.

2. Preliminary Report on Conditions Affecting the Repatria ation of Afghan Refugees, prepared by Richard English, for UNHCR. June 1988.

3. Evaluating des Consequences Humaines Sociales et Ecologiques de la Gverre en Afghanistan. by Mark Slivirski. Burean International Afghanistan and Medecins Sans Frontieres, Paris 1988.

4. First Consolidated Report Office of the U.N Co-ordinator for Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes Relating to Afghanistan. September 1988.

report on the Humanitarian Relief and Economic Assistance Programme for Afghanistan. The programme is comprised of two phases. The first phase relates to the question of immediate relief and rehabilitation which needs to be implemented as rapidly as conditions permit. An eighteen month period has been allocated for this phase. The total cost of this phase amounts to $ US 1,1166.1 million. The second phase relates to the question of long term rehabilitation of the country's infra-structure. It is to follow the first plan. A further three year period has been allocated for this phase with an estimated cost of $ 839.6 million.

In response to the Secretary General's appeal, a pledging conference was held in New York on October 12, 1988. The meeting began with the Secretary General's official launching of the 'OPERATION SALAM' for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. Considerable pledges of US $ 800 million were made by the donor countries just in one day. It was a very encouraging response and by the end of November 1988 the commitments for donations raised upto $ 887.61 million, which has facilitated the co-ordinator's office in the implementation phase of the programme.

The co-ordinator's office, with the help of surveys conducted by different relief agencies, has outlined the

priority operations and the allocation of funds in the first phase of Operation Salam which is as follows:

	Relief/Rehabilitation needs 1988/89 US $ million
Voluntary repatriation	
Health	8.0
Transport/Logistics	169.4
Water supply	3.0
Household goods	5.0
Shelter	22.0
Agricultural inouts	4.8
Agency operational support	13.2
TOTAL	225.4
Food aid	
Repatriation refugees/internally displaced persons	239.5
Vulnerable groups	6.1
School children	6.3
Food-for-work programme	80.0
Agency operational support	3.5
TOTAL	335.4
Agriculture and rural development	
Agricultural inputs	164.5
Agriculture	56.8
Irrigation	53.1
Rural development	58.0
TOTAL	332.4
Social Services	
Health programmes	37.2
Drugs and medicines	19.0
Water supply and sanitation	17.7
Education	50.0
Clearance of mines	9.0
TOTAL	139.2
Communications, industry and power	
Transport/logistics	42.4
Communications	16.7
Industry	40.3
Power	29.9
TOTAL	129.3

Administration and management	
Planning and statistics	6.0
Project formulation/monitoring	1.5
Project management	0.5
Monuments/culture survey	2.7
TOTAL	10.7
GRAND TOTAL	1,166.1

Main features of UN Co-ordinator's Plan

The first consolidated report from the office of the United Nation's co-ordinator for Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programmes relating to Afghanistan reveals that "In view of the uncertainty of the evolving situation, relief and rehabilitation programmes inside Afghanistan will have to be assessed and reassessed - based on the reliable and accurate information and advice available - as circumstances change. A selective and flexible 'grass root level' strategy will be crucial to the success of timely and effective assistance. In particular decentralized strategy will be necessary on a region by region basis". The execution of operations will depend upon the establishment of proper information gathering and planning as well as measures to ensure reliable programme management and administration.

The overall responsibility for ensuring coherence in the planning of United Nations System - supported relief and rehabilitation activities falls on the co-ordinator for this programme. In this context, the office of the co-ordinator at Geneva will, in collaboration with relevant agencies and orgnizations, namely, UNDP, FAO,

UNHCR, WFP, WHO and UNICEF, ensure the project formulation, funding, and implementation with a central aim of efficient and timely use of donor's resources. It is also envisaged in the plans that the repatriation and relief operations should be co-ordinated with the reconstruction operations so that a sufficient degree of self reliance could be achieved.

Non-government organizations have been assigned the field level execution of relief and reconstruction operations: Many of them have the experience of cross border relief operations for many years. It has also been assumed by the co-ordinator's office that in the initial years of recovery, country-wide planning implemented by a central planning authority may not be feasible. Therefore, the implementation of plans will have to be location - specific and implemented through decentralized machanisms and partners. The prossible partners could be local commanders, local governments/administrations and some kind of committees.

Problems

Among many problems which would come in the way of reconstruction a few of them are enlisted below.

Mines

The presence of mines directly affects prospects of repatriation and economic recovery. The problem of mine clearance will require a major co-ordinated international

effort. The exact number of mines planted by the parties in the conflict is not known, but estimatedly are in millions. These mines are at least of twenty types. Thousands of people have been killed and maimed by these mines. These mines are usually found around garrisons, security posts, alongside major roads, along tracks used by the Mujahideen, around villages that have been captured and then vacated by Soviet-Afghan forces and around economic facilities. The routes into Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan are thought to be particularly affected.

Infra-Structural Problem.

The presence of a comprehensive physical infrastructure is essential to absorb large scale relief and reconstruction assistance. The nine years of war in Afghanistan has resulted in an extensive destruction of physical infrastructure in most of the areas. Accurate information on the extent of damage is not available but according to some estimates:

- About 70% of the paved roads and 25% of the secondary roads have been damaged.
- Around 300 bridges have been destroyed.
- More than 60% of the rural health facilities have been destroyed.
- Some 2,000 school buildings have been damaged, most of them require reconstruction.
- More than 1/3 of the pre-war villages have been

made uninhabitable due to war activities.

- Agricultural fields and irrigation system has been systematically destroyed, particularly in the Mujahideen controlled areas.

The absence of such infrastructural facilities creates enormous problems with regard to repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation operations, particularly, in the rural sector. The infra-structure level reciprocates with the pace of recovery.

Dynamic Political Situation.

At present, when Operation Salam has been launched by the United Nations, there is a great deal of uncertanity in the evolving political situation in Afghanistan. It is predicted by many diplomats, academicians and researchers that, in future, there is going to be a weak centre with very strong provinces. If that be the case in future, reconstruction activities cannot be integrated into a permanent overall framework at the national and provincial level. This might result into greater inputs with lesser outputs. Therefore, political stability is an important and necessary criterion to achieve significant tangible results from the recovery investments.

Emerging Power Structure.

As seen by the intellectuals studying developments

in Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal, the real power will rest with the local commanders in Afghanistan in their respective areas. The relief distribution and reconstruction activities will greatly depend on the inter-relationship of the commanders in a particular region or area. Due to the geographical constraints and poor lines of communication access to many areas will depend on the co-operation of the local commanders. In absence of such cooperation many areas, in need of relief assistance, will be deprived of it. Some commanders, may take advantage of such geographical constraints. It has been outlined in the plans of the United Nation's co-ordinator that the relief assistance will be distributed in partnership with the local government or administrations established in the rural area of which 95% is under Mujahideen's control, and belongsto one or the other political parties. There are many independent groups controlling large territories. All these power groups will try to dominate each other in terms of economic gains, may be at the other's expense. Economic infrastructure with a military muscle will give greater autonomy to the regions, and localities which will supplement a weak central authority.


U.N System Lacks the Infrastructure and Effectivness.

The present level of infrastructure, which can be used by the U.N co-ordinator, in the form of U.N agencies and NGO's, appears to be insufficient to ensure the full coverage of the needs of more than seven million people

following the completion of repatriation. Professional and skilled Afghan manpower which has to be involved as a necessary part for the implementation of relief and reconstruction operations is very insufficient as compared to the present requirment.

NGO's will have a very special role to play in assisting the United Nations system to implement humanitarian and economic assistance programes, especially in view of their grass root level experiences and contacts with local authorities. The co-ordinator intends to maintain very close working relationship with the relevent NGO's. A UNHCR report reveals that most of the cross border agencies lack the professional skills or administrative resource to implement regular assistance programes over a wide area. However, many of the NGO's working among refugees in Pakistan possess the administrative abilities plus the experienced expatriate and Afghan staff to undertake assistance programes of considerable size. But these agencies neither have the contacts with the Afghan local administrations nor the experience in conducting the cross border operations.

As the United Nations co-ordinator said "fanning of political differences through wrong distribution of relief assistance would be the most destructive process". To target any particular group within the population for assistance is likely to exacerabate local tensions and create enormous security problems for the implementing



The Institute of Strategic Studies

ISLAMABAD

<u>AFGHANISTAN AND THE RE-CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS</u>

<u>AFTER THE WAR</u>

BY

FAZAL-UR-RAHMAN

PRESENTED AT THE SEMINAR

'THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN'

TEHRAN

JANUARY 15-16 1989

Discussion Draft only

AFGHANISTAN AND THE RE-CONSTRUCTION PROBLEM AFTER THE WAR

FAZAL-UR-RAHMAN
RESEARCH FELLOW
THE INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
ISLAMABAD

For presentation at the Seminar 'The future of Afghanistan' , TEHRAN
January 15-16,1989.

The following views are those of author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Institute.

INTRODUCTION.

The reconstruction of Afghanistan is an uphill task. There are a many predictable and unpredictable problems in the process of reconstruction of a war devastated country.

In this brief paper an attempt has been made to assess some of the problems which could arise, in future, due to the evolving political situation and insufficient facilities to implement the programmes, regarding the repatriation and re-construction.

Due to the non availability of accurate information regarding the present prevelent situation, extensive help has been taken for the preparation of this paper, from surveys, assessments and reports prepared by UN agencies and other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).

The first part of this paper deals with the background information regarding the need for re-construction. The second part reveals some aspects of the planning done by UN Co-ordinator in regard to the repatriation and reconstruction of Afghanistan.

The third, and the last part highlights the problems of re-construction from political and infra-structural angles.

BACKGROUND

The signing of the Geneva accords on April 14, 1988 laid the basic political framework for the settlement of the nine year old Afghan conflict. As a result of this conflict, around one million people have died, more than five million people fled from their country and about two million have been internally displaced. The physical infrastructure, social services and the agricultural sector- the backbone of the Afghan economy - lie shattered and destroyed. Today the Afghan nation and the World community face the challenge of rehabilitation and reconstruction of this war torn country. A large scale comprehensive planning and assistance is required to meet the challenge. It was felt necessary that the aid provided to the conflict ridden country should be on humanitarian grounds and without any preconditions to avoid the political influence of donor countries. On May 11, 1988, the Secretary General of the United Nations appointed a co-ordinator for "the co-ordination of all activities of the U.N. system in respect of the relief and rehabilitation needs relating to Afghanistan".

The U.N. Secretary General launched an appeal for donations by presenting the co-ordinator's comprehensive